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‘Curiouser and Curiouser!’: Organizations as Wonderland; a Metaphorical Alternative 
to the Rational Model 
Abstract 
The metaphors in Morgan’s (1986) Images of Organization largely imply order, rationality, 
stability and manageability. This reflects that the text is concerned to facilitate the design and 
management of organizations. This article draws on Lewis Carroll’s (1865) novel Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland to propose Wonderland as an alternative metaphor that places 
issues such as absurdity, irrationality, uncertainty and disorder, centre stage. Rather than a 
marginal or temporary aberration, it is argued that such conditions need to be understood as 
an everyday experience for many. This metaphor is important because those who are tasked 
to manage organizations may find it stressful and puzzling that they are so inept, when they 
compare their experiences and achievements with the rational model. In this sense, it offers 
both comfort and perhaps encouragement but it should also foster humility and caution in 
terms of what those at the top can achieve. Likewise, those on the receiving end of irrational 
decisions or who reside in absurd worlds can gain solace from knowing that they are not 
alone whilst those concerned to resist such conditions can find strength in the knowledge that 
those in positions of authority are not omniscient/omnipotent. 
Key words: Absurdity, Change, Disorder, Literature, Metaphor, Irrationality, Rationality. 
Introduction 
Images of Organization is aimed at ‘managers and professionals in all walks of life’ (Morgan, 
1986: 11) and although this is said to include trade unionists, the book is imbued with a 
managerial perspective. This is explicit in the concern to provide a ‘general method of 
analysis’ that ‘can be used as a practical tool for diagnosing organizational problems, and for 
the management and design of organizations’ (Morgan, 1986: 12). The metaphors that are 
provided are often grounded in a rational, ordered view of the world, which tends to squeeze 
out absurdity, disorder, uncertainty and the irrational features of organizing that are equally 
relevant to everyday life. In short, the metaphors aim to expand our horizons through 
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avoiding ‘partial’ and ‘one-sided’ insights and yet collectively they are locked within a 
psychic prison ‘of their own making’ (Morgan, 1986: 228).  
This article draws on Lewis Caroll’s (1865) novel Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland to 
propose Wonderland as a new metaphor for organizations. It provides an alternative way of 
analysing organizations, which counters the rationality evident in the metaphors Morgan 
(1986) presents.  This is necessary because absurdity, irrationality, uncertainty and disorder 
are part of the everyday experience for many. Hence, in an account of workplace bloggers, an 
Office Manager wrote ‘I blog as a stress outlet. My workplace is unavoidably ridiculous and 
my writing relieves the built-up tension' (Richards, 2008: 102).  
The wonderland metaphor seeks to draw attention to that which is ridiculous, irrational, 
disordered, unpredictable, uncertain, unexpected, stupid, inane, nonsensical, contradictory or 
just plain silly in organizations. Although there is a body of work that questions the rational 
model (e.g. Ashforth and Fried,1988; Brunsson,1982; Bryman,1984; Cohen et al,1972; Kets 
de Vries,1980; March,1996; March and Simon,1958; Mumby and Putnam,1992; Putnam and 
Mumby,1993; Weick,1976), which will be discussed below, it remains sporadic and marginal 
compared with the dominant rational ethos. We need a metaphor therefore that can pull 
together these disparate strands, which can provide an alternative to the rational model.  
Morgan (1986) considered how we can become ensnared by particular modes of thought 
through his metaphor of the psychic prison. Rationality infuses this metaphor, however, 
because it postulates that we can escape such prisons. By contrast, the wonderland metaphor 
highlights the way in which the metaphors Morgan (1986) presents fail to fully countenance 
disorder, uncertainty, the absurd and the irrational due to his emphasis on managing or 
‘overcoming’ the ‘deficiency’ of existing organizations (Morgan, 1986: 299). It has been 
argued that ‘power issues’ have been neglected in relation to metaphor (Gabriel et al, 2011: 
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370) and so as a ‘radical’ metaphor (Morgan, 2011: 468), Wonderland adds to debate and 
understanding because it challenges orthodox ‘logico-scientific’ (Gabriel et al, 2011: 367) 
thinking and ways of organizing that pervade business, government and academia.  
The justification for the Wonderland metaphor is that if we think about organizations through 
metaphors that emphasize stability, order, rationality and manageability then much of 
organizational life is left out. Alternative metaphors are therefore required to ‘illuminate the 
Shadow side’ (Nord and Jermier, 1994: 398) of organizations. According to Morgan (1986) 
‘the use of metaphor implies a way of thinking and a way of seeing that pervades how we 
understand our world more generally’ (1986:12) and yet metaphors such as the machine, 
organisms, cultures and the brain lead us to think within the rationality of the present system 
not to question it whilst others such as the instruments of domination and the psychic prison, 
imply that we can escape extant conditions.  
The wonderland metaphor is different in that it urges us to question and interrogate the 
rational order; to examine its shortcomings, weaknesses and failures as a condition of what 
happens when people attempt to organize themselves in particular ways. It does not argue 
that rationality must be abandoned because that would be absurd, life threatening and 
‘patently distorting and false’ (Morgan, 2011: 463). Instead, it aims to illuminate neglected 
features of organizational life even though this inevitably means ‘hiding others’ (Hatch and 
Yanow, 2008: 36).  
The Wonderland metaphor is a ‘sensitizing’ (Weick, 1976: 2) device that draws attention to 
conditions that are palpably ridiculous, irrational or illogical. It seeks to make the ‘familiar 
more familiar’ (Oswick et al, 2002: 295) by adding ‘analytical depth and richness’ (Fleming, 
2005: 48) to our understanding of organizations. The central question that the paper explores 
is how our understanding of organizations can be advanced through a Wonderland metaphor? 
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Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify my understanding of Morgan’s (1986) text. 
Rather than reflecting his perspective or a managerial perspective, it may be argued that 
Morgan (1986) merely presents each metaphor as representative of a particular school of 
organization theory. This assumption sits uneasily with the central premise of the book, 
however, which ‘is that our theories and explanations of organizational life are based on 
metaphors that lead us to see and understand organizations in distinctive yet partial ways’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 12). It follows from this argument that Morgan’s (1986) reading of the texts 
he presents must also be informed by a metaphor or perspective but he does not acknowledge 
this or fully explain his metaphor. I will argue that his perspective or metaphor intrudes upon 
his reading and representation of the literature he reviews not least because there is a 
managerial purpose to the book evident in the concern to show how metaphors can be used 
‘for the management and design of organizations’ (Morgan, 1986: 12). A tension arises 
between Morgan’s (1986) attempt to make sense of the perspectives underpinning various 
schools of organization theory and the simultaneous concern to present them and his method 
of analysis as a ‘practical tool’ for managing organizations.   
The closest Morgan (1986) comes to explaining his own perspective suggests considerable 
affiliation with a Wonderland metaphor for it is argued that the book aims to use ‘different 
metaphors to understand the complex and paradoxical character of organizational life’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 13; emphasis added). As none of Morgan’s (1986) individual metaphors 
place absurdity centre-stage, it is to be expected that such conditions are passed over because 
each metaphor, as Morgan (1986) argues, focuses on some issues but not others. 
Nevertheless, absurdity is central to the book in that collectively the metaphors are 
understood to allude to the paradox of organizational life. This reflects ‘the wholeness 
approach’ whereby ‘the meanings of concepts [individual metaphors] change when they are 
5 
 
combined’ (Ӧrtenblad, 2010: 446). The book is therefore about paradox and yet it is also 
paradoxical because it attempts to provide a way to manage paradox. 
Morgan’s (1986) representations of the individual metaphors will be discussed with a view to 
surfacing the paradoxes and absurdities that each alludes to but which Morgan (1986) 
underplays. It seeks to draw out some of the ways in which Morgan (1986) reads and 
represents certain literature, which appears to reflect his perspective rather than necessarily 
the metaphor he is representing. In this sense, it attempts a ‘critical reading’ of the text, which 
Ӧrtenblad (2010: 445) describes as a ‘fragmentary approach’ but it also attempts to 
understand what Morgan (1986) means when ‘using a specific label’ (Ӧrtenblad, 2010: 447) 
or metaphor to depict a body of work, which Ӧrtenblad (2010) defines as an ‘interpretive 
approach’. 
The article has four sections; the first discusses literature that has already questioned the 
rational model of organization. The second examines Morgan’s (1986) metaphors to illustrate 
how each of them approaches rationality, their limitations and the need for a different 
metaphor. The third section introduces the Wonderland metaphor and ten possible ways 
through which it can be used to analyse and understand organizations. Finally, the major 
insights of the paper are drawn out in a discussion and conclusion. 
Beyond the Rational Model 
The traditional model of organization is imbued with what Weber (1964) termed 
‘instrumental rationality’ whereby managers deploy formal rationality (planning, analysing, 
measuring, costing, comparing) for the substantively rational end of profit. The mainstream 
business and management literature assumes that such ‘instrumental rationality dominates 
thinking and practice and constitutes the guiding star for organizational activity’ (Alvesson, 
1984: 70). Bryman (1984) puts it like this, the rational model ‘conceptualises the organization 
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as an instrument or tool designed to achieve a specific goal or cluster of related goals’ 
(Bryman, 1984: 391). In view of the limited ‘ends’ (see Alvesson, 1984) of instrumental 
rationality, we can question whether the rational model is rational but there are other critiques 
that question whether organization’s conform to the rationality that instrumental rationality 
presupposes. Referring to decision making processes, Cohen et al. (1972:2) argued that rather 
than adopting a rational, logical, ordered approach, managers often muddle through and they 
represented organizations as: 
 a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision 
situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they 
might be the answer, and decision-makers looking for work (Cohen et al., 1972: 2) 
 
These insights allude to various absurdities whereby solutions precede problems and 
ideas/interests are pursued/voiced, irrespective of the problems faced (see also Weick, 1976: 
4). This critique does not, however, question instrumental rationality only the processes 
involved in getting there. It indicates that conditions are more confused than the rational 
model supposes but suggests that this can be resolved through more careful or thought 
through planning.  
 
Meyerson and Martin (1987) adopted a similar line of argument when they presented three 
different views of culture that can be simplified as rational, semi-rational and irrational. The 
latter fits with the wonderland metaphor and echoes Weick (1976) as it includes change that 
is ambiguous and ‘paradoxical’, where ‘means and ends are perceived as connected loosely, 
if at all’ (Meyerson and Martin, 1987: 640). And yet, such cultures are said to work or be 
appropriate in certain settings, for example, ‘where creativity and constant experimentations 
7 
 
are valued’ or ‘where ambiguity is unavoidably salient’ (Meyerson and Martin, 1987: 641). 
Despite drawing attention to ‘irreconcilable meanings’ and changes that are by definition 
‘uncontrollable’ (Meyerson and Martin, 1987: 642); these authors underplay irrationality and 
disorder and re-impose the rational model by arguing that such cultures make ‘possible play, 
serendipitous outcomes and ambiguity in decision-making procedures’ (Meyerson and 
Martin, 1987: 642).  
 
The rational model assumes that managers are completely informed of all the alternatives and 
select the one best way to proceed so as to maximise profitability. This has been criticised by 
institutional theorists (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and the theory of ‘bounded rationality’, 
which argues that: 
It is impossible for the behaviour of a single, isolated individual to reach any high 
degree of rationality. The number of alternatives he (sic) must explore is too great, the 
information he (sic) would need to evaluate them so vast that even an approximation to 
objective rationality is hard to conceive (Simon, 1957: 79).  
According to ‘bounded rationality’, the environment is too complex to allow for an 
exhaustive analysis of all possible solutions. Moreover, people’s capacity to perceive and 
process information is limited even with sophisticated technology. This means that 
individuals cannot achieve a high degree of rationality nevertheless, individuals are still 
assumed to pursue ‘instrumental rationality’ but without a crystal ball to guide them. It 
reflects a managerial perspective that is concerned with issues around decision making in 
complex situations and the potential for innovation (see March, 2006: 211).  
To understand that the ‘intentions and actions’ of organizations are ‘loosely coupled’ (Weick, 
1976: 4) moves us away from the rational model and Morgan (1986: 196) links this to a 
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political systems metaphor (see discussion below). Weick (1976) focused on the functions 
and dysfunctions of loose coupling and this contrasts with the non-managerialism of the 
Wonderland metaphor, which is not concerned with, for example, whether it is ‘the existence 
or nonexistence of loose coupling that is a crucial determinant of organizational functioning’ 
(Weick, 1976: 12) i. Instead, the wonderland metaphor seeks to provide a torch to illuminate 
and examine the ways in which those who work in organizations be they frontline employees 
or managers regard their working lives as ridiculous.   
 According to Pfeffer (1977) ‘What is rational given the standards and criteria of one group, 
such as employees, may be quite irrational given the standards or criteria of another group, 
such as owners’ (Pfeffer, 1977: 239). This argument offers a ‘pluralistic’ (Alvesson, 1984: 
69) critique of rationality for it recognises that different ‘interest groups’ may act according 
to their own rationality. Nevertheless, Pfeffer (1977) assumes that organizations can be made 
to work in a more rational way through recognising, accommodating and balancing multiple 
interests/rationalities. Instrumental rationality is not questioned only the means to achieve it. 
 
Brunsson (1982) distinguished between ‘decision-rationality’ and ‘action-rationality’, which 
provides another critique of the rational model. This draws our attention to different levels of 
rationality in terms of strategic versus operational decision making. Hence decision 
rationality asks whether decisions conform to rational criteria/behaviour and action rationality 
explores how decisions work out in action. It highlights that rational decisions can lead to 
irrational actions and that what is rational depends on the level of analysis or whether you are 
making decisions or are a recipient of the decision. This is a useful way to understand that 
organizations may not conform to the rational model but the underlying thrust of the 
argument is that we need to ensure that rational decisions are applied in a rational way. As 
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Reed (1991) argues of Brunsson’s (1989) more recent work, he elaborates ‘the complex 
interaction between ideas and action...[but]...rational decision-making theory...continues to 
set the agenda to which he responds’ (Reed, 1991: 561). 
Another literature that usefully moves us away from the rational model recognises the 
‘emotionality of rationality’ (Mumby and Putnam, 1992: 480) and it highlights that 
managers’ decisions and actions have as much to do with emotions (anger, jealousy, pride, 
greed, fear) as rationality. Linstead (1995), for example, argued that senior management can 
launch ‘an emotional defence of its position in language which evokes rationality but which 
is not itself a rational argument’ (Linstead, 1995: 204). This points towards the fusion of 
rationality and emotion but this literature does not make the case for the irrational or 
disordered aspects of organizational life but rather encourages us to focus on the ways in 
which ‘subtle emotional agendas are employed, or woven into, decisional processes’ 
(Fineman, 1996: 557). It draws our attention to organizations as emotional arenas but not 
necessarily towards absurdity.  
Recent scholars have introduced the notion of ‘stupidity’, which relates to the wonderland 
metaphor. It questions the ‘increasing veneration of smartness’ (Ten Bos, 2007: 142) in 
organizations and posits that ‘wisdom and stupidity are not necessarily at odds with each 
other’ (Ten Bos, 2007: 147). Similarly, Alvesson and Spicer (2012) propose the notion of 
‘functional stupidity’, which refers to issues that ‘are neither semi-rational nor purely stupid’ 
(Alvesson and Spicer, 2012: 1194-5). The implication of Alvesson and Spicer’s (2012) 
analysis is that stupidity can be overcome through mobilizing ‘reflexivity’; questioning 
‘dominant beliefs and expectations’ and ‘inter-subjective reasoning and dialogue’ (Alvesson 
and Spicer, 2012: 1204). By contrast, the Wonderland metaphor encourages an analysis of 
stupidity as a condition of complex organizations. It does not support the view that stupidity 
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can be dislodged. This is because attempting to manage stupidity will generate other 
stupidities reflecting bureaucratic (Weber, 1964) and emotional issues (Mumby and Putnam, 
1992) but also unintended consequences (Boudon, 1981) and the power relations (Foucault, 
1982)ii that infuse organizations.  
Alvesson and Spicer (2012) posit that ‘functional stupidity’ can hinder and serve both 
organizations and individuals. It can serve through providing ‘a sense of certainty’ (Alvesson 
and Spicer, 2012: 1209) whereby critical reflection is discouraged and conformity promoted. 
In such situations, employees align themselves (stupidity self-management) with corporate 
norms pushing ‘doubt and questioning to one side’ (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012: 1209) whilst 
employers evade the costs of critical reflection.  The authors are concerned to avoid this 
situation hence they suggest that practitioners should ‘inject some form of critical thinking 
into organizational life’ which ‘will help to unsettle forms of functional stupidity’ (Alvesson 
and Spicer, 2012: 1216). Albeit critical, there is managerialism in ‘functional stupidity’ that 
differentiates it from the Wonderland metaphor in the sense that functional stupidity holds 
out the promise that rationality can be created or restored. This is evident in Alvesson and 
Spicer’s (2002) assertion that dialogue ‘can act as a space that potentially could undermine 
functional stupidity’ (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012: 1212). Moreover, the argument that 
‘stupidity should not be rooted out of the organization completely’ (Alvesson and Spicer, 
2012: 1216) contrasts with the Wonderland metaphor, which avers that stupidity, 
irrationality, disorder and uncertainty cannot be ‘rooted out’ even if management seeks to 
achieve this end.      
To summarise this section, there have been many critiques of the rational model, which 
suggest ‘that it is rare in nature’ (Weick, 1976: 1) but much of this literature slips back into 
the rational fold by highlighting ways to mend the broken bridge between predictability and 
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disorder. It asks us to consider the complexity of rationality whether due to multiple interests 
or different levels of rationality and provides a more ‘humble conception of reason’ (Tsoukas 
et al, 2003: 1006). It therefore resonates with the Wonderland metaphor but, in different 
ways, it seeks to manage and therefore inject rationality back into the corporate patient, for 
example, by assuming as Ten Bos (2007) argues that ‘forms of stupidity can somehow be 
overcome’ (Ten Bos, 2007: 142) or that absurdity can be managed by turning ‘our thinking 
about management upside down’ (Farson, 1996: 44). This literature does not therefore accept 
such conditions as an everyday feature of organizational life that needs to be investigated as 
proposed by the Wonderland metaphor. 
Images of Organization: The Need for an Alternative Metaphor 
This section explores the eight metaphors Morgan (1986) represents to illustrate how many of 
them reinforce the rational model and in doing so it makes the case for a new metaphor. 
Images of Organization provides multiple metaphors for understanding organizations ‘in the 
belief’ that they ‘are generally complex, ambiguous, and paradoxical’ (Morgan, 1986: 17). 
This questions the rational model but a tension is evident in Morgan’s (1986) concern ‘to 
learn to deal with this complexity’ (Morgan, 1986: 17) for the purposes of managing it. The 
representation of the individual metaphors proceeds with this rational view in mind and so, in 
effect, the metaphors tend to rule out a sustained analysis of the irrational, absurdity, 
uncertainty and disorder. At times, this reflects the rationality of the literature reviewed but 
also, at times, the rationality that imbues the book or, in other words, Morgan’s (1986) 
unstated metaphor. A significant difficulty in analysing Images of Organization is trying to 
disentangle when it is Morgan’s (1986) personal perspective that is being voiced versus his 
representation of literature to illustrate a particular metaphor. Of course, this Gordian knot 
does not exist if it is believed that the two can be separated but this only stands if it is 
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believed that we can analyse and represent the world in a way that is free of our own 
metaphors. Moreover, the task is complicated by the managerial inclination of the book that 
intrudes upon how the metaphors are represented.  
Organizations as Machines 
The metaphor of organizations as machines exemplifies the rational model but Morgan’s 
(1986) discussion of its ‘limitations’ shares considerable overlaps with the concerns of the 
wonderland metaphor. Hence Morgan refers to the ‘great human cost’ (Morgan, 1986: 31) 
that can arise through this mode of organizing, for example, he discusses what seems to me to 
be the absurd situation of Frederick the Great of Prussia reforming his army in ways that 
reduced ‘soldiers to automata’ (Morgan, 1986: 25). Rather than a condition of organizational 
life these ‘pernicious’ outcomes are represented as unintended consequences or bi-products 
of overly mechanistic thinking. Organizations, even if they are managed in a mechanistic 
way, are not seen as absurd per se but rather their consequences are understood to be 
damaging if mechanistic principles are taken too far or are applied in an inappropriate 
context. It appears that Morgan (1986) veers towards a more negative reading of the machine 
metaphor given his extended discussion of its disadvantages compared with its advantages. A 
machine metaphor does not draw us towards the ridiculous, irrationality, disorder or absurdity 
although these are evident in Morgan’ (1986) account of its limitations in terms of means 
becoming ends; dehumanization; mindless bureaucracy and inflexibility. 
The representation of this metaphor implies that its limitations can be avoided if managers 
adopt different metaphors that are more ‘appropriate for managing in these new times’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 38). And yet, machine thinking often creeps back into organizational life or 
is reproduced through seemingly “new” interventions such as the ‘team’ (e.g. Barker,1993), 
which Morgan (1986) links with the cultures and brain metaphors. The irrationalities that 
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flow from the machine metaphor (discussed as its ‘limitations’) may therefore re-surface even 
if other metaphors are employed to manage organizations. Moreover, even if this 
reproduction can be avoided other absurdities are apt to arise in relation to the other 
metaphors as will be discussed below. 
Organizations as Organisms 
Rationality informs the organizations as organisms metaphor hence it urges us to think about 
organizational forms as species that are ‘better “adapted” to specific environmental 
conditions than others’ (Morgan, 1986: 39). The image that this conveys is one of 
leaders/strategists logically scanning the marketplace and adopting organizational forms that 
are best suited to it (e.g. contingency theory). The organism metaphor is said to have 
‘changed’ (Morgan, 1986: 40) the earlier mechanistic one and yet both are ‘locked into a 
form of engineering preoccupied with relations between goals, structures, and efficiency’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 40).  An emphasis on rationality endures therefore but they differ in that the 
organism metaphor recognises multiple organizational forms that fit better with different 
environments.  
An opposing but equally rational theory is the “natural-selection” approach, which assumes 
that ‘environments select organizations for survival’ (Morgan, 1986: 68), which Morgan 
(1986) argues ‘many theorists believe’ to be ‘far too deterministic’ (Morgan, 1986: 68). A 
third ecological perspective advances the view that environments and organizations are 
cocreative.  The rationality here is that organizational ‘collaboration’ (Morgan, 1986: 70) is 
needed to render environmental ‘turbulence more manageable’ (Morgan, 1986: 71). The 
comforting language of ‘common values’ and ‘shared problems’ (Morgan, 1986: 71) that 
pervades this metaphor sits uneasily, however, with the competition, exploitation, 
profiteering and growing inequality within society. As Morgan (1986) notes, the organism 
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metaphor all too readily depoliticises organizations. It imputes a neutral naturalism to 
phenomena that are loaded with vested interests. 
The organism metaphor is also linked to ‘people’ having ‘complex needs’ (Morgan, 1986: 
71) but the socio-technical, human relations or human resource managers who must satisfy 
these needs are no less rational than before they just have a more complicated human 
machine upon which to work and a more varied tool kit with which to motivate it. It is  
posited that these needs ‘must be satisfied in a mutually acceptable way....otherwise the 
health of the overall system suffers’ (Morgan, 1986: 72)  but the organism metaphor, as 
Morgan (1986) states, ‘runs the danger of producing an organizational society’ where ‘people 
become resources to be developed, rather than human beings who are valued in themselves’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 76).  
According to Morgan (1986), the ‘sociotechnical approach suggests that by accommodating 
and balancing basic needs, strategic management can create a much more harmonious and 
productive work environment’ (Morgan, 1986: 72-73). This is problematic because it 
neglects the inequalities and struggles that such processes conceal and contribute to. Hence 
Morgan (1986) asserts: ‘Imagine a sociotechnical system where human needs characteristic 
of the higher reaches of Maslow’s need hierarchy meet assembly-line technology’ (Morgan, 
1986: 72). It is asserted that the abrasion will result in ‘human boredom and alienation where 
game playing and sabotage emerge as a means of gaining self-respect’ (Morgan, 1986: 72). 
This argument suggests that if higher human needs are met (i.e. self-esteem, self-
actualization) then politics and sabotage, which are irrational from a managerial perspective, 
can be resolved. And yet, these higher human needs are increasingly part of workplace 
struggles. This is evident in management programmes that target subjectivity through 
espousing autonomy, freedom, responsibility, teamwork and identification with corporate 
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norms (see Fleming and Sturdy, 2009; du Gay and Salaman1992; McCabe, 2009; Willmott, 
1993).   
The ‘systems theory’, which the organism metaphor draws on, assumes that it is possible to 
‘find ways of managing the relations between critical subsystems and the environment’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 48). As Morgan (1986) explains in his discussion of its limitations, a 
functional rationality is evident and this is apparent in its medical analogies (‘organizational 
ailments’, ‘organization doctors’) that equate organizations with the body that can be subject 
to ‘diagnosis and prescription’ (Morgan, 1986: 62) whereby it is possible to ‘identify and 
eliminate potential dysfunctions’ (Morgan, 1986: 48). Rather than allowing ‘us to break free 
of bureaucratic thinking’ (Morgan, 1986: 48) or instrumental rationality then, the organism 
metaphor reproduces them in a variety of ways and new uncertainties and struggles arise.  
Organizations as Brains 
In his discussion of organizations as brains, Morgan (1986) muses upon its potential to create 
organizations that can adapt to ‘changing circumstances’ (Morgan, 1986: 78). This refers to 
dispersed ‘brainlike capacities throughout an enterprise’ (Morgan, 1986: 79) whereby the 
whole is replicated in each of its parts. A functional rationality continues to underpin this 
metaphor because it assumes that information systems can overcome the limitations of 
bounded rationality. Sophisticated information systems have accelerated electronic cash 
flows and the potential irrationality of such systems was painfully exposed during the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In the case of the GFC, information systems contributed to 
less brainlike activities, which is apparent in the lack of joined up thinking in the run up to 
the crisis. Moreover, the rationality of cybernetics did not appear to apply for ‘significant 
deviations’ were not identified nor was ‘corrective action’ (Morgan, 1986: 87) initiated by the 
governments or financial institutions that contributed to the GFC. The knowledge of the 
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whole was not ‘enfolded in the parts, allowing the system to learn and self-organize’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 95). This can also be said of the individual banks that failed for their retail 
arm rarely knew what their investment arm was doing and it appears that few had any 
understanding of the whole. 
 A fundamental problem with ‘intelligent, self-regulating’ systems is that ‘the system can 
maintain only the course of action determined by the operating norms or standards guiding it’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 95). This takes us back to the limitations of bounded rationality because 
rationality depends, at least in part, on system designers creating rational systems and yet 
human knowledge remains imperfect. Moreover, one has to ask whose interests are served by 
the wider system of which the systems are a part. This raises moral questions for as Morgan 
(1986) argues simple cybernetic systems ‘are unable to question the appropriateness of what 
they are doing’ (Morgan, 1986: 87).  
Morgan (1986) provides an excellent analysis of the problems of single-loop learning (i.e. 
non-questioning bureaucratic systems) and the obstacles facing double-loop learning or 
systems that allow for ‘challenge’ to ‘operating assumptions’ (Morgan, 1986: 91), which 
illuminates that organizations do not always behave in rational ways. A learning-oriented 
approach seemingly offers a solution to this, which encompasses a pluralistic rationality 
whereby conflict is aired and debated thereby surfacing ‘different viewpoints’ through a 
‘participative approach’ (Morgan, 1986: 92). Guidelines are presented for developing a 
learning-oriented approach that include accepting ‘legitimate errors’ and viewing ‘negative 
events and discoveries’ as a ‘source of knowledge and wisdom’ (Morgan, 1986: 91) and yet 
this neglects vested interests, unintended consequences and economic insecurities.  
In short, the power relations and politics that Morgan (1986) explains undermines learning do 
not feature in relation to the solutions offered nor do they appear to pose a fundamental 
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problem for those who view organizations as brains. For example, teams or autonomous work 
groups are a key feature of organizations as brains and yet such forms of work have been 
widely criticised as a means to foster work intensification and subjugation (e.g. Barker, 1993; 
Parker and Slaughter, 1988). Power and inequality then all too readily disappear such that the 
language of ‘common values’ and ‘shared purpose’ (Morgan, 1986: 104) surfaces. In 
concluding the Chapter, Morgan (1986) acknowledges the ‘danger of overlooking’ (Morgan, 
1986: 109) conflict, power and control, which highlights the limitations of this metaphor for 
such conditions, are apt to give rise to uncertainty and irrationality.  
Organizations as Cultures 
Absurdity is not the focus of any of Morgan’s metaphors and so it is entirely understandable 
that conditions which are absurd are passed over. This is inevitable because each metaphor as 
Morgan (1986) points out leads us to focus on some issues but not others. This is evident in 
his discussion of organizations as cultures, where Japan is used to illustrate how cultures 
emerge through historical contexts. Morgan (1986) quite rightly points out the opposing 
views of Japanese organizations whereby they are equated with collectivism and harmony 
(Morgan, 1986: 116) versus ‘personal deprivation’ and ‘gruelling’ working conditions 
(Morgan, 1986: 117).  This contradiction is passed over and yet such representations point 
towards an absurd situation whereby we cannot distinguish between polarised accounts of 
organization.  
‘Dazzling success stories’ which ‘tell of the way the Japanese arrive at work early or stay late 
to find ways of improving efficiency’ (Morgan, 1986: 117) point towards other absurdities. 
That is to say, how can work intensification be labelled a success? Where is the success or 
rationality in people being so consumed by work that it saturates their lives? These 
absurdities indicate the need for a different metaphor that focuses on such issues.  
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The North American culture is illustrated through Peters and Waterman’s (1982) example of 
Tupperware. Morgan (1986: 119) discusses how the positive reinforcement of sales is 
ritualized through a “Rally” for all saleswomen. It is argued that ‘The ceremony combines 
head-on competition with a positive tone that suggests that everyone wins’ thereby 
‘reinforcing desirable behaviour evident in so many American parent-child relations’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 120). If we were to re-read this example drawing on the Wonderland 
metaphor it would result in a different analysis. One would point towards the humiliation and 
infantilization of imposing parent-child relations on adults or the silliness of cheering the sale 
of plastic boxes. It would involve reflecting on whether the sale of plastic boxes indicates that 
someone is a “winner” along with the stupidity of a culture of winning. The latter necessitates 
that there are losers and obfuscates that the vast majority do not win. This points towards the 
irrationality of a society that is legitimated on the grounds of winning where winning is 
largely the preserve of elites and their descendents. 
In another example, Morgan (1986) contrasts an American insurance company’s public 
‘ethos of harmony and cooperation’ (Morgan, 1986: 122) with a private view, where ‘people 
often expressed considerable anger and dissatisfaction with various staff members and with 
the organization in general’ (Morgan, 1986: 123). This situation is not described as absurd 
and Morgan (1986) displays instrumental rationality, when he argues that: 
 the problems lay in the way it [the team metaphor] was coupled with norms favouring 
passivity. Had the metaphor been linked with an ethos favouring openness and 
innovation, and team players encouraged to make active contributions, the company’s 
fortunes could have turned out very differently indeed (Morgan, 1986: 124).  
At such times, Morgan (1986) appears to present his perspective rather than necessarily the 
literature he is reviewing. In contrast to this rationality, a Wonderland metaphor suggests that 
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even if a different approach had been pursued new absurdities or problems would have 
arisen. To illustrate this, Morgan (1986) offers Hewlett-Packard as an example of a company 
that did not make the above mistakes, for example, one of its founders broke the padlock off 
a laboratory door, when it was found to be locked on a Saturday leaving the instruction – 
“Don’t ever lock this door again. Thanks Bill”. This is presented as a story or legend about 
the organization that conveyed the message: ‘we trust and value you. You are free to be 
enthusiastic about your job even if it’s Saturday’ (Morgan, 1986: 124; emphasis added).  
A Wonderland metaphor would draw out different insights hence it is evident that employees 
are not free because management has the authority to issue commands to others. Moreover, it 
implicitly says that you are not free even at the weekend for senior managers will patrol 
offices and laboratories to see who is really enthusiastic about their work. Instead of people 
enjoying a life beyond work it conveys the absurd expectation that individuals should be 
inhabited by work.  To avoid this absurdity, the CEO could have left the lock in place and 
promoted the individual who put it there thereby signifying a very different story, message or 
legend. Yet no doubt had he done so another absurdity would have arisen whereby the truly 
“enthusiastic” employee would have found another way to continue working. 
Overall, there is a tension in the culture metaphor. Though sophisticated in its rendition of the 
living quality of culture and the necessity of its ongoing enactment or accomplishment, the 
chapter suggests that culture can be manipulated. Hence it is stated that ‘the culture metaphor 
points towards another means of creating organized activity: by influencing the language, 
norms, folklore, ceremonies, and other social practices that communicate the key ideologies, 
values, and beliefs guiding action’ (Morgan, 1986: 135). This rubs up against the subsequent 
statement that managers ‘can never control culture’ (Morgan, 1986: 139) and this tension 
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demands further explanation because it is not clear whether the culture metaphor assumes 
that organizations can or cannot be managed.  
A key distinction between the culture and wonderland metaphor can be traced to Morgan’s 
(1986) contrast between the ‘myth of rationality’ that is argued to inhabit modern society and 
the culture metaphor, which directs us towards ‘the symbolic or even “magical” significance 
of even the most rational aspects of organizational life’ (Morgan, 1986: 135). The distinction 
is that the culture metaphor is presented as an alternative form of rationality. Instead of 
statistics one has rituals or myths or ceremonies that govern behaviour. The metaphor, as it is 
presented, is bound up with a humanistic rationality. Hence it is argued that ‘The results of 
research on organizational culture show how this form of symbolic management can be used 
to shape the reality of organizational life in a way that enhances the possibility of coordinated 
action’ (Morgan, 1986: 135-136). This allows the humanistic leader to ‘play a background 
role, shaping the all-important stage of action and the general direction that events will take 
but leaving choice about details to those responsible for their implementation’ (Morgan, 
1986: 136). Irrationality, uncertainty and disorder slip into the shadows. The culture 
metaphor largely erases what is said to be ‘the basic uncertainty and ambiguity underlying 
many of our values and actions’ (Morgan, 1986: 135) because it reinforces key aspects of the 
rational model albeit through rituals, stories and legends.  
To conclude this section, culture can be seen as something an organization is versus what an 
organization has (Smircich, 1983). The former follows in the anthropological tradition of ‘a 
process embedded in context’ whereas the latter presents culture as ‘an objectified tool of 
management control’ (Wright, 1994: 4). The latter approach haunts the way in which the 
culture metaphor is presented, which sits more easily with using metaphor as a ‘practical 
tool’ (Morgan, 1986: 12). It illuminates how the aims of the book colour the representation of 
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the metaphors and points toward the need for another metaphor because clearly if culture 
cannot be managed then this gives rise to all kinds of uncertainty and potentially absurd 
situations.  
Organizations as Political Systems 
The metaphor of organizations as political systems begins with an absurdity although it is not 
named as such, which is that employees in work settings are often denied the rights he/she 
enjoys as a citizen – ‘to hold his own opinions, make his own decisions, and be treated as an 
equal’ (Morgan, 1986: 141). This is attributed to ‘highly authoritarian’ or ‘dictatorial modes 
of rule’ and it is argued that ‘Not all organizations are characterized by such entrenched 
relations’ (Morgan, 1986: 142). Rather than articulating the metaphor of organizations as 
political systems, this appears to be Morgan’s (1986) perspective on the matter. Yet from a 
more radical position, it could be argued that this absurdity is not only the domain of 
autocratic systems because to different degrees, it is evident in all of the forms of governance 
Morgan (1986) discusses (bureaucratic, technocratic or democratic) for even cooperatives or 
mutual organizations rarely allow employees a substantial voice or freedom in their day to 
day lives (see Knights and McCabe, 2003). 
The ‘Wheeling and dealing’ (Morgan, 1986: 148) of diverse interests is presented as an 
Aristotelian view of politics, which renders outcomes uncertain and so this metaphor 
resonates with the wonderland metaphor. This is especially evident in Morgan’s (1986) 
assertion that ‘politics’ is ‘an inevitable feature of organizational life’ and that ‘Rationality is 
always political’ (Morgan, 1986: 195), which ‘helps to explode the myth of organizational 
rationality’ (Morgan, 1986: 195). Nevertheless, politics is also presented as something ‘that 
must be resolved through political means’ (Morgan, 1986: 148) and it is argued that there are 
‘many ways in which this can be done’ (Morgan, 1986: 148). The managerial belief that 
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politics can be ‘resolved’ albeit through political means tends to contradict the assertion ‘that 
organization is intrinsically political’ (Morgan, 1986: 142). This could be interpreted as the 
aims of the book intruding upon the representation of the political systems metaphor. 
Alternatively, one could take it to infer that the political systems metaphor contains divergent 
views and Morgan’s (1986) analysis certainly alludes to such tensions. The political systems 
metaphor points towards similar organizational dynamics as bounded rationality for both 
mean that ‘The organization often has to be content with satisfactory rather than optimal 
solutions to problems’ (Morgan, 1986: 155) and yet this still confers considerable rationality 
upon organizations albeit an imperfect one.   
It is argued that the ‘use’ of this metaphor ‘may generate cynicism and mistrust’ when ‘we 
begin to see politics everywhere’ (Morgan, 1986: 197) and this appears to concern Morgan 
(1986). He posits that it is ‘for this reason, the metaphor must be used with caution’ (Morgan,  
1986: 197) but, from a radical perspective, one could argue that perhaps this is necessary in a 
world of immense inequalities. Morgan (1986) also seems concerned that the metaphor will 
be used by corporate Machiavelli’s to advance their ‘personal interests’ (Morgan, 1986: 197). 
This is contrasted with an approach which would ‘use the political metaphor to generate new 
insights and understandings that can help us to deal with divergent interests’ (Morgan, 1986: 
197; emphasis added), which necessitates ‘genuine openness and collaboration’ (Morgan, 
1986: 198). This appears to be Morgan’s (1986) perspective rather than necessarily a political 
systems metaphor but perhaps he is merely taking on a pluralist/Aristotelian perspective? 
Either way, it is suggested that the metaphor can be used so that organizations can be made to 
work in a rational, pluralist and consensual way.  
Morgan (1986) posits that the ‘Aristotelian vision of politics’ is one of politics as a 
‘constructive force’, which can be used to ‘restructure the relationship between organizations 
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and society’ (Morgan, 1986: 198), which appears more radical than pluralist. The rationality 
underpinning the concern to use politics as a ‘constructive force’ seems doomed, however, 
because it is argued that ‘Ultimately, some people have much more power than others’ and 
‘ultimate power rests with those who are able to define the stage of action’ (Morgan, 1986: 
198). It is not clear whose view this reflects but it rubs up against a pluralistic solution 
because if only certain individuals/groups possess ‘ultimate’ power to effect change then they 
may resist change that threatens such power.  
To sum up, the tension at the heart of this metaphor is that the Aristotelian or pluralistic view 
suggests that people should act in the interests of all and yet the more radical arguments that 
Morgan (1986) also refers to imply that this is improbable.  This tension is significant 
because it is not clear whether the metaphor means that politics can or cannot be resolved or 
managed. The former fits with the aims of the book whereas the latter rail against it. 
Organizations as Psychic Prisons 
The central belief underpinning the psychic prisons metaphor is that ‘human beings have a 
knack of getting trapped in webs of their own creation’ (Morgan, 1986: 199). Rather than 
accepting or exploring disorder, uncertainty or absurdity, it is argued that the metaphor ‘helps 
identify ways out of these self-created traps’ (Morgan, 1986: 228). This is bound up with the 
assumption that ‘people have an ability to free themselves from imperfect ways of seeing’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 200), which fits with the rational model of organization. Hence it implies that 
there are perfect ‘ways of seeing’ or grasping ‘the world’ (Morgan, 1986: 200). 
Rationality is evident in the assertion that the ‘institutionalized inefficiency’ (Morgan, 1986: 
201) of the Fordist psychic prison can be superseded by the Just-in-time (JIT) system because 
‘progressive firms are now challenging the wisdom of such organized inefficiencies’ 
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(Morgan, 1986: 201). The absurdity of the JIT system for those who work in such regimes 
described elsewhere as ‘management-by-stress’ (Parker and Slaughter, 1988) is absent from 
the account.  To have discussed this would have meant acknowledging that we may move 
from one absurdity to another but this does not fit with the psychic prison metaphor for it 
promises escape through our ‘ability to think critically and to engage in the required reality 
testing’ (Morgan, 1986: :202).   
Drawing on Freud, repressed sexuality of which we are ‘unconscious’ is offered as another 
illustration of a psychic prison, which is said to underlie ‘many of the most difficult and 
entrenched corporate problems’ (Morgan, 1986: 210). Although not discussed in this way, 
Morgan’s (1986) analysis suggests that repressed ‘unconscious’ desires, anxiety, 
competition, fears and anger are apt to generate absurdities in organizational life. 
Nevertheless, even that of which we are unconscious is seemingly governable for ‘much’ can 
‘often be done to resolve problems at the personal and interpersonal level’ (Morgan, 1986: 
210). It is argued that these ‘destructive impulses are often unleashed’ by cultures with an 
‘ethos of cut-throat competition’ (Morgan, 1986: 220). The implication being that other 
cultures or methods for ‘the design of change’ (Morgan, 1986: 223) can resolve or ameliorate 
them. In short, that of which we are unconscious ‘may be built into work and organization’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 227) and therefore resolved through rational thinking.  
Likewise, recognition of the ‘conceptual prison’ of ‘patriarchy’ (Morgan, 1986: 211) also 
becomes a means to transform the ‘corporate world’ and its ‘values’ so as to align them with 
‘matriarchal values, which emphasize unconditional love, optimism, trust, compassion, and a 
capacity for intuition, creativity, and happiness’ (Morgan, 1986: 212). Although the latter is 
to be wholeheartedly welcomed, it implies that the bars of the gendered psychic prison can be 
exploded through a masculine blast of rationality so as to impart matriarchal values.  
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Morgan (1986) also discusses the ‘myth of immortality’ as another psychic prison, whereby 
we deny our death, impermanence, vulnerability and lack of control, which resonates with the 
wonderland metaphor. It is argued that ‘in attempting to manage and organize our world we 
are really attempting to manage and organize ourselves’ (Morgan, 1986: 213). This is 
manifest in myths, rituals, humour, goal setting and planning. Although true, Images of 
Organization can also be understood as an attempt to manage ‘our world’ and ‘ourselves’. 
Rather than embracing and seeking to understand our ‘vulnerability and lack of control’, as 
proposed by the Wonderland metaphor, the metaphors are, at times, presented as a means to 
manage it. Hence even whilst stating that ‘Rationality and irrationality....appears to be central 
to the human condition’ (Morgan, 1986: 229) and that ‘the unconscious is by nature 
uncontrollable’ (Morgan, 1986: 231), the psychic prison metaphor is argued to identify ‘many 
of the barriers standing in the path of innovation and change’ (Morgan, 1986: 229). This is 
said to be ‘in perfect harmony with the metaphor of the psychic prison for a vision of 
confinement is invariably accompanied by a vision of freedom’ (Morgan, 1986: 228). To sum 
up, a ‘repressive’ (Foucault, 1982) view of power underpins the psychic prison metaphor for 
it is premised on the belief that we can escape power and yet the absurdity is that as we seek 
to escape one psychic prison we are apt to forge the bars of another. 
Organizations as Flux and Transformation 
The metaphor of flux and transformation and its concern with the ‘pathological 
consequences’ of ‘the underlying logics of change’ (Morgan, 1986: 271), also resonates with 
the Wonderland metaphor. Hence the transience and temporality of organizations is 
acknowledged, which militates against the control and order embedded in the rational model. 
Nevertheless, this metaphor seeks to identify the ‘hidden processes’ or ‘logics of change – 
that help to explain the concrete form of the world at any given point in time’ (Morgan, 1986: 
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234). To identify these ‘logics of change’, Morgan (1986) partly draws inspiration from the 
natural sciences, systems theory and autopoiesis, which understand systems as wholes rather 
than separate parts. Here, the source of change is linked to ‘random variations’ and ‘chance 
interactions’ (Morgan, 1986: 239), which takes us beyond the rational model of causation but 
only temporarily because once change is set in motion by random acts, order is seemingly 
restored in ways that allow for transformational effects.  
The metaphor points towards absurdities such as organizations failing to see that they are part 
of their own environment, which leads to environmental destruction. The rational model is 
evident, however, in the suggestion that such irrationalities can be avoided through 
thinking/acting ‘systemically’ rather than in self-interested ways (Morgan, 1986: 246). This 
systemic rationality appears evasive because ‘Egocentric corporate cultures’ continue to 
dominate whereby organization’s ‘achieve their success at the expense of their wider context’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 246). Morgan (1986:247) refers to the ‘ability’ of ‘individuals and 
organizations’ to ‘influence’ and ‘shape the future’ and yet this causality (even if complex) 
rubs up against the randomness and unpredictability of this metaphor. Indeed, it points 
towards uncertainty and disorder rather than ecological harmony. 
The flux and transformation metaphor is further explained through referring to dialectics or ‘a 
way of thinking in terms of opposites’ (Morgan, 1986: 257). Through discussing Marxist 
dialectics, Morgan (1986) explains the logic of capital accumulation and the contradictions 
that this gives rise to (e.g. ‘man’s mastery of nature turns back on man’ (Morgan, 1986: 
265)). The latter resonates with the wonderland metaphor because it is indicative of 
uncertainty for as Morgan’s (1986) representation of this metaphor suggests, ‘contradictions’ 
are as much a part of the capitalist system as its injustices. It is posited that ‘there is a self-
generating aspect to many contemporary problems’ that can only be tackled ‘by addressing 
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the logic that produces them’ (Morgan, 1986: 271) and this points towards the need for 
systemic change but it also suggests that contradictions can be resolved through changing 
society. 
As perverse as it may seem, inequality is a taken-for-granted feature of our society but 
irrationality is not. Surfacing irrationality then, as an everyday condition of working life, may 
help to ‘reframe’ (Morgan, 1986: 266) our understanding of organizations in ways that foster 
change. In contrast to the flux and transformation metaphor, Wonderland does not offer a 
way of ‘managing change’ (Morgan, 1986: 268) but given the unpredictability that this 
metaphor illuminates it may help to stimulate change. In the event, the diagnosis that ‘new 
problems of a similar kind will reappear’ (Morgan, 1986: 271) is surely correct. This is 
certainly the case if conditions such as irrationality, disorder, contradiction and uncertainty 
are understood to be a condition of complex organizations.  
Organizations as Instruments of Domination 
The question of rationality is discussed in relation to the instruments of domination metaphor, 
where it is argued that ‘organizations as rational enterprises pursuing goals that aspire to 
satisfy the interests of all....is more an ideology than a reality’ (Morgan, 1986: 275). This 
appears to be due to ‘asymmetrical power relations that result in the majority working in the 
interests of the few’ (Morgan, 1986: 275). It is stated that ‘Organizations are often used as 
instruments of domination that further the selfish interests of elites at the expense of others. 
And there is often an element of domination in all organizations’ (Morgan, 1986: 275; 
emphasis added). Rather than the instruments of domination metaphor, this appears to reflect 
Morgan’s (1986) perspective because critical scholars who subscribe to this metaphor would 
not see domination as a temporary or partial condition. 
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Influenced by Marx and Weber, this metaphor draws our attention to how top down power is 
exercised through domination, in ways which present the extant order as unshakable. The 
metaphor provides ammunition through which to criticise the rationality of the established 
order for it is grounded in the subjugation, misery and exploitation of others. Indeed, it is 
argued that rationality can be ‘profoundly irrational for many’ (Morgan, 1986: 316). The 
rationality of the established order is also questioned in relation to instrumental rationality. 
Hence Michels ‘iron law of oligarchy’ asserts that ‘modern organizations typically end up 
under the control of narrow groups, even when this runs up against the desires of the leaders 
as well as the led’ (Morgan, 1986: 277). This irrational situation is based on the assumption 
that leaders are able to gain ‘near monopoly power’ (Morgan, 1986: 278) and so the metaphor 
proffers a dystopian view of some organizations.  
The Wonderland metaphor does not question whether organizations are arenas of inequality 
but does question whether power is the preserve of elites. In short, the Wonderland metaphor 
asks us to consider organizations not in terms of the unitary rational model or a bleak house 
of domination because power is understood to operate in a far more fluid, messy and 
uncertain way than either of these positions suggests. The merit of which is that it holds out 
the possibility of change.     
Rather than representing the literature that adheres to this metaphor, the argument that 
‘nondominating forms of organization are possible’ such that we must ‘distinguish between 
exploitative and nonexploitative forms’ (Morgan, 1986: 318) appears to reflect Morgan’s 
(1986) own perspective. Hence, from a Marxist perspective, which fits with the instruments 
of domination metaphor, all forms of profit-making organizations are exploitative. It appears 
that for Morgan (1986) the instruments of domination metaphor only applies in certain 
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situations such as when multinationals switch to cheaper sources of labour or to “the 
radicalized organization” where there are ‘warring factions’ (Morgan, 1986: 297).  
The discussion of both the domination and political systems metaphors, equate ‘radical’ with 
what I understand to be particular management styles be they autocratic unitary or an 
adversarial form of pluralism. Hence it is posited that unitary and pluralist positions can 
become radical if managers shape their ‘relations with their workforce as a battle’ (Morgan, 
1986: 299) and that ‘many organizations become radicalized in ways that stress “them and 
us” attitudes’ (Morgan, 1986: 316). In this way, the wider implications and analytical 
relevance of the domination metaphor are diminished. Hence it does not just apply to 
antagonistic settings given its focus on inequality and privilege. These conditions exist 
whether a unitary or pluralist perspective prevails for both can be analysed from a radical 
perspective as different expressions of domination. 
A ‘radicalized organization’ is not only equated with certain management styles but also 
‘where at least one major section of the workforce experiences a sense of exploitation and 
responds in a solidaristic way’ (Morgan, 1986: 298) or a situation where ‘a unionist or other 
radical employee’ may seek to unite ‘the workforce against management’ (Morgan, 1986: 
298).  This mistakenly equates ‘radical’ with antagonism and collective resistance. It is 
mistaken because resistance is far more widespread and takes many different forms (see 
Ackroyd and Thompson,1999; Jermier et al., 1994). Second, a ‘radical’ frame of reference 
not only relates to conflict/antagonism/resistance but also to how domination works to secure 
consent, which Morgan (1986) only briefly alludes to in his discussion of Weber. Finally, the 
representation of this metaphor tends to equate certain ‘radical’ forms of organization, where 
exploitation, conflict and resistance prevail, with irrationality. It implies that more rational 
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situations exist in other organizations but many of those who view the world through an 
instrument of domination metaphor would not agree with this partitioning. 
Overall, this section has highlighted that whilst the metaphors Morgan (1986) represents offer 
a rich pallet through which to analyse organizations that includes many irrationalities, many 
reflect a managerial rationality and, at times, this informs the way they are presented. To 
some extent this is inevitable because disorder, the irrational, the absurd and uncertainty have 
to be rubbed out in order to lay claim to be able to manage organizations. It has been argued, 
however, that this tends to eclipse other aspects of life that coexist with the rational. 
Organizations as Wonderland? 
The genesis of the Wonderland metaphor can be partly traced to my experience of a dispute 
at a university. A strategy was developed in secrecy that advocated compulsory redundancies 
due to a temporary fall in student numbers. A number of colleagues involved in the dispute 
commented on what they saw as the irrationality of management and the absurdity of the 
situation they found themselves in – ‘Curiouser and curiouser’ one individual wrote in an 
email that conveyed the dreamlike quality of the experience. This phrase appears in Lewis 
Carroll’s (1865/2008) Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and it conveys Alice’s surprise at 
the unfolding events in Wonderland. It resonated with many of my earlier empirical 
observations, for example, managers in a manufacturing company rejecting a more efficient 
way of working because frontline employees rather than engineers suggested it (McCabe, 
1996).  In another instance, a bank that I researched designed a new system of work as if its 
employees were robots, which led to various forms of resistance (McCabe, 2007). It was 
indeed curious that the bank’s management introduced these changes through emphasizing 
the importance of teamwork, initiative and the need for employees to take responsibility 
(McCabe, 2009).   
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It was a combination of these strange experiences and empirical observations that drew me to 
Lewis Carroll’s (1865/2008) Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland as a means to develop a 
different way of seeing organizations.  It depicts a strange world where nothing is quite as it 
seems which Alice often regards as ‘very absurd’ (Carroll, 2008: 26). The book begins with 
an encounter with something completely unexpected: the White Rabbit, which is absurd for it 
is both clothed and talks and yet it echoes the ‘rational’ world, for the White Rabbit is 
worried that it will be late. First of all then, the wonderland metaphor draws our attention to 
the unexpected; it says that we should expect the unexpected and not assume that things will 
follow a rational, ordered pattern.  
The Wonderland metaphor embraces and expects ‘out-of-the-way things’ which led Alice to 
begin to think ‘that very few things were impossible’ (Carroll, 2008: 6). Rather than reading 
this through a managerial lens of assuming that all things are possible providing that we put 
our minds and muscles to the plough, I take it to mean that things which we do not expect to 
happen may well happen. If this is applied to organizations it could lead to greater tolerance 
for things going wrong and might mean that managers are less ‘shocked’ when people resist 
their interventions (see McCabe, 2011). It could also lead to more caution when introducing 
change. Such thinking might also prepare the ground for people to resist when it is expected 
that previous organizational actions, promises or discourses may be contradicted. And yet, 
from this perspective, the outcomes of resistance must also be understood to be uncertain. 
This is a stronger assumption than the more cautious one proposed by the political systems 
metaphor, which acknowledges that ‘some uncertainty almost always remains’ (Morgan, 
1986: 171). 
Second, the Wonderland metaphor asks us to question the rational model, which is imbued 
with the assumption that people but also ‘things’ will behave in compliant ways.  As Alice 
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pursues the White Rabbit down the rabbit hole and begins to fall, she discovers that gravity 
does not follow its normal rules. This resonates with Pickering’s (1993) point in relation to 
understanding scientific practice that ‘The contours of material agency are never decisively 
known in advance’ (Pickering, 1993: 564). Similarly, Leonardi (2011) asserts that 
‘technologies exercise agency through their “performativity”….in other words, through the 
things they do that users cannot completely or directly control’ (Leonardi, 2011: 148). This is 
not to suggest that we must abandon the laws of physics but it is to acknowledge that we do 
not always know how objects let alone humans will act in relation to a given intervention. In 
an insurance company, for example, management invested in a new information technology 
(IT) system to reduce costs, which would partly be achieved through reduced staffing. The 
object or IT did not, however, behave as was expected and management were forced to 
recruit more staff (McCabe, 2002). The metaphor therefore asks us to question our beliefs 
and to be open to new possibilities rather than taking the rational model for granted. 
As Alice falls down the rabbit hole during her pursuit of the White Rabbit she ponders 
various questions to which she concedes she does not know the answers and thinks of words, 
the meaning of which she does not know. This lack of knowledge about the world is the third 
element of the Wonderland metaphor, which can be contrasted with the organizations as 
brains metaphor. Hence it recognises that we do not always know or fully understand the 
world we inhabit and it urges us to investigate how this applies to practice and to those in 
organizations. This is not to say that better Knowledge Management is needed as Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1993) embracing the rational model would contend but rather to acknowledge that 
‘Knowledge is a concept far too loose, ambiguous, and rich, and pointing in far too many 
directions simultaneously to be neatly organized, co-ordinated, and controlled’ (Alvesson and 
Karreman, 2001: 1012; see also McDermott, 1999).  In this sense, knowledge can be 
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compared to the elusiveness of the White Rabbit, for as we attempt to explain or control it 
(see Knights and McCabe, 2003a), it scurries away and ‘is no longer to be seen’ (Carroll, 
2008: 5).  This elusiveness is elegantly expressed in Polanyi’s (1966) popular phrase: ‘We 
can know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi, 1966: 4). 
The rational model is grounded in the belief that ‘a’ leads to ‘b’ or, in other words, that the 
future follows on from actions we take in the present. The future is predicable and all of our 
actions are predicated on this assumption. In Wonderland the future is not known. Alice does 
not know what it will bring and to recognise this given the recent uncertainties in relation to 
the GFC should foster caution, modesty and humility on the part of those who seek to 
exercise power over others. After becoming lost in the rabbit hole, Alice finds a way out but 
she is too big to pass through a tiny door that offers escape. Having drunk from a bottle 
marked ‘drink me’, without knowing the consequences of doing so and shrinking to ten 
inches, Alice ponders the outcome of further shrinkage. She compares herself to a candle 
going out and asks ‘I wonder what I should be like then?’ (Carroll, 2008: 8). This 
contemplation of oblivion is absurd from the rational model because it is grounded in the 
assumption that the world tomorrow will be much the same as it is today. This predictability 
is what gives meaning to our actions, stability to society and it provides a sense of economic 
and existential security. A fourth feature of a wonderland metaphor then would be to 
acknowledge that the future is to some extent unknown. 
At ten inches, Alice is now too small to reach the key to unlock the tiny door as it is on a 
table that is beyond her reach. Her solution is to eat a small cake marked ‘EAT ME’ in a little 
glass box. She speculates ‘if it makes me grow larger, I can reach the key; and if it makes me 
grow smaller, I can creep under the door’ (Carroll, 2008: 9). In either scenario Alice assumes 
positive outcomes will follow from her actions and this raises a fifth insight that the 
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Wonderland metaphor draws our attention to for she now grows to more than nine feet. This 
relates to the unintended consequences emanating from any course of action (see Boudon, 
1981), which can have positive as well as damaging outcomes. Hence Morgan’s (1986) 
instruments of domination metaphor highlighted that ‘industrial accidents’ may ‘occur 
because of problems unintentionally built into the structure of plant and buildings’ (Morgan, 
1986: 290). The point is that we do not know what the outcome of our actions will be. Indeed 
even if we act so as to remedy the problems created through previous actions new problems 
may emerge ‘“and things are worse than ever”’ (Carroll, 2008: 16). Foucault puts it like this 
‘People know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do; but what they 
don't know is what they do does.’ (Personal Communication in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 
187). The melting of the polar ice caps is a relevant point hence industrialists did not set out 
to destroy the environment but global warming has emerged as an unintended consequence of 
the pursuit of profit. 
Nonsense, is a sixth insight that the Wonderland metaphor highlights for once Alice escapes 
the rabbit hole she meets an array of creatures that speak nonsense to her including a Lory 
who states ‘I am older than you, and must know better’ (Carroll, 2008: 22). In addition to this 
being illogical, the Lory refused to say how old it was. This is redolent of those in positions 
of authority making illogical statements which those lower down the pecking order are 
seemingly expected to accept (Linstead, 1995). It echoes the political systems metaphor 
where it was argued that managers ‘often use the idea of rationality as a resource for pursuing 
political agendas’ (Morgan, 1986: 195). Hence in the case of a manufacturing company, 
unions were expected to accept pay differentials because one plant was argued to be more 
productive than another and yet management could not convincingly substantiate this claim. 
It also ran counter to previous promises that there would be pay parity across the two sites 
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(Lockyer and McCabe, 2011). This point elucidates the need to interrogate claims that 
ostensibly appear rational because rationality and claims to rationality are not free from 
power. The Holocaust provides an extreme example of this, when ‘Reason itself’ came ‘to be 
used for insane purposes’ (Burrell, 1999: 140; see also Bauman, 1988). Of course, those 
seeking to exercise power will not regard their claim to rationality as nonsense and so to 
some extent this analysis requires one to take on the position of those who are on the 
receiving end of such claims.   
During Alice’s conversations with the Blue Caterpillar, she is continually contradicted and 
contradiction is the seventh feature of this metaphor. To illustrate this point, a major building 
society advanced a one team vision for the organization, which included a concern to 
promote openness and honesty. In a call centre of the Society, management proceeded to 
introduce ‘individual’ pay awards, which staff were asked to keep secret (Knights and 
McCabe, 2003). In Morgan’s (1986) account of the instruments of domination metaphor he 
discussed an automobile factory where ‘the explicit policy is “safety first,” the reality is 
“safety when convenient”’ (Morgan, 1986: 290). Elsewhere, a bank extolled the importance 
of staff delivering service quality but instigated a system for promoting quality that 
prioritised cost reduction, which effectively squeezed out intangible issues such as customer 
service (Knights and McCabe, 1997).  All of which created the type of uncertainties for 
employees that Alice experienced as she grew or shrank in size for ‘how puzzling all these 
changes are! I’m never sure what I’m going to be, from one minute to another!’ (Carroll, 
2008: 55). 
The eighth element of the Wonderland metaphor is that it turns traditional hierarchical, top 
down power relations, characteristic of the instruments of domination metaphor, upside 
down. Hence the Frog-Footman did not restrict Alice’s access to the Duchess and Alice 
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simply walked past him. Alice then observed a cook throwing everything from ‘saucepans, 
plates and dishes’ at the Duchess without rebuke even ‘when they hit her’ (Carroll, 2008: 62). 
Similarly, when the Queen of Hearts screams ‘Off with her head!’ Alice replies ‘Nonsense!’ 
(Carroll, 2008: 86) and later, the Cheshire Cat tells Alice that the Duchess has ‘boxed the 
Queen’s ears’ (Carroll, 2008: 89). These hierarchical markers of privilege (Duchess, 
Footman, Cook, Queen) indicate that inequality endures in Wonderland and antagonism is an 
everyday feature of life but still it is evident that power is not a possession of the elite alone.   
In contrast to the metaphors Morgan (1986) represents, which tend to present those in 
positions of authority as powerful, in Wonderland, the seemingly powerless are able to 
exercise power. This resonates with Foucault’s (1982) argument that the ‘exercise of power 
consists in guiding the possibilities of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome’ 
(Foucault, 1982: 221). All kinds of unknowns flow from this ‘relational’ (Foucault,1982) 
understanding of power because it means that one is always acting upon targets that are 
capable of exercising power themselves or, in other words, acting contrary to your desires. It 
provides a different insight than the organism metaphor, which drawing on the Hawthorne 
studies, recognised ‘unplanned interactions’ (Morgan, 1986: 41). The difference is that this 
does not just apply to certain working conditions (i.e. ‘routine, boring, low-discretion jobs’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 72)) or when there is a failure to consider higher order ‘needs’ (Morgan, 
1986: 72) but applies more broadly.  
The ability of others to exercise power is not something that can be managed as the political 
systems metaphor tended to suggest when it was posited that ‘resistance’ to an idea might 
emerge before ‘most’ come to ‘accept’ (Morgan, 1986: 153) it. This is because according to a 
‘relational’ (Foucault,1982) view of power, power is not something that can be ‘possessed by 
leaders’ or other ‘social groups’ (Morgan, 1986: 174) and so it points to a more fluid and 
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unpredictable situation. This is not to suggest that Morgan (1986) is unaware of or neglects 
the manifold ways in which power is exercised only that the Wonderland metaphor is 
concerned with how power is exercised rather than working from the assumption that some 
possess power whilst others do not.  
Alice joins a mad tea-party with the March Hare, the Dormouse and the Hatter. As she 
approaches, although the table is large, all three cry ‘No Room! No Room!’ (Carroll, 2008: 
71).  Similarly, when the Queen of Hearts instructs her soldiers to execute other soldiers they 
ignore her but then claim that ‘Their heads are gone’ (Carroll, 2008: 88). These lies point 
towards a ninth feature of the wonderland metaphor – dishonesty, deviance or misconduct. 
This includes acts of misbehaviour defined as ‘anything you do at work you are not supposed 
to do’ (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 2).   Embedded in the rational model is the assumption 
that individuals act in accordance with corporate regulations and/or in honest ways. This 
tends to obscure acts of deviance by both employees (Mars, 1982) and managers (Bensman 
and Gerver, 1963; Lawrence and Robinson, 2007) as Volkswagen’s recent ‘efforts to cheat 
on clean air rules’ (Rusche, 2015: 26) illustrates.  It is important to recognise therefore that 
individuals may act in their own interests rather than those of the organization (see Watson, 
1994). Nor do they necessarily follow the rules or always tell the truth because career 
ambitions, inequalities and power relations infuse everyday life in ways that can lead people, 
perhaps through fear, to construct or falsify accounts in support of their endeavours (see 
Anand et al., 2005; Lockyer and McCabe, 2011; Vaughan, 2009). The organizations as 
political systems metaphor discussed similar irrationalities (Morgan, 1986: 158) and yet, by 
contrast, it posited that such ‘conflicts can be managed’ (Morgan, 1986: 158). 
A tenth insight that can be gleaned from the Wonderland metaphor relates to the 
indeterminacy of meaning and to the propensity for confusion or a lack of understanding to 
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prevail in organizations. These types of confusions are evident when the March Hare tells 
Alice you ‘should say what you mean’: 
‘I do.’ Alice hastily replied; ‘at least – at least I mean what I say – that’s the same thing you 
know.’ 
‘Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter (Carroll, 2008: 73).  
Alice subsequently informs the Hatter ‘I don’t quite understand you’ and this ambiguity is 
evident throughout the book as people and creatures tend to talk past each other. This insight 
can also be found in the work of Franz Kafka, where ‘misunderstanding’ predominates and it 
has been argued that this presents ‘a weapon against the mythologies of the new bureaucratic 
order’ (Munro and Huber, 2012: 533). It resonates with the ‘dark side’ of organizations or 
‘how things go wrong in socially organized settings’ (Vaughan, 1999: 273), which surfaces 
issues such as mistakes and disasters. The wonderland metaphor departs, however, from the 
organizational behaviour literature that restricts the dark side to deviance, dysfunction or 
abnormality that is seen as intentionally harmful to others (Griffin and O’Leary-Kelly, 2004). 
This is because harm is not always due to accidents, errors or things not working as they were 
intended but may reflect the profit motif, greed or particular working conditions, which the 
instruments of domination metaphor alludes to. In short, harm (e.g. stress) may stem from 
functionality or things working as they were intended to work.  
This section has offered a new metaphor that counteracts whilst not entirely rejecting the 
rational model. Through its ten-interconnected points, it surfaces issues that are often 
neglected or marginalised and overall it offers a non-prescriptive, non-managerial and 
distinctive way of analysing and understanding organizations: 
1. Expect the Unexpected 
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2. Anticipate the Unpredictability of Objects/People 
3. Recognise the Limits of Knowledge  
4. Appreciate that the Future is Uncertain 
5. Examine Unintended Consequences 
6. Interrogate Claims to Rationality 
7. Explore Contradictions 
8. Question a Top-down Understanding of Power 
9. Investigate Dishonesty, Deviance and Misconduct 
10. Identify Confusion/Misunderstanding/Ambiguity 
 
 These interrelated points are not exhaustive of the metaphor, which more generally directs us 
towards the ‘strangeness’ of organizations. They need to be considered in conjunction with 
the points raised in the critique of the rational model and the discussion of the metaphors 
Morgan (1986) represents.  It is not claimed that these issues are entirely neglected by 
Morgan (1986) but in combination and spirit they provide a different focus for analysis than 
his metaphors.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
According to Morgan (1980), metaphor ‘is a creative form which produces its effects through 
a crossing of images’ whereby ‘the processes of comparison, substitution, and interaction’ act 
‘as generators of new meaning’ (Morgan, 1980: 610). He subsequently posited that 
‘Metaphor turns imagination in ways that forge an equivalence or identity between separate 
elements of experience’ (Morgan, 1983: 602), which allows us ‘to see the world anew’ 
(Barrett and Cooperrider, 1990: 222). Reflecting the uncertainty, strangeness and absurdities 
in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Wonderland can be used as a metaphor to surface 
issues in organizations that question the rational model. The Wonderland metaphor invites 
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‘further “filling in”’ (Cornelissen, 2005: 757) of ‘features that previously were considered not 
salient’ (Cornelissen, 2005: 755) given the dominance of the rational model.  
Morgan’s (1986) approach towards metaphor indicates that he is sensitive to the issues raised 
by the Wonderland metaphor. Hence he argues that ‘managers and organization theorists’ 
often attempt to override ‘complexity by assuming that organizations are ultimately rational 
phenomena that must be understood with reference to their goals or objectives’ (Morgan, 
1986: 322). He suggests that this ‘gets in the way of realistic analysis’ and advocates that we 
‘start from the premise that organizations are complex, ambiguous, and paradoxical’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 322). This suggests that we should begin with the Wonderland metaphor. On 
the other hand, however, as he acknowledges, he adopts ‘a managerial point of view’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 334) and avers that ‘the important point is that the insights of all the 
metaphors can be used prescriptively’ (Morgan, 1986: 334). In this way, he rules out the 
Wonderland metaphor because the essence of this metaphor is that it is non-managerial and 
so it militates against prescription (other than as a research agenda), which from a managerial 
perspective points to its ‘limits and downsides’ (Morgan, 2011: 466-7). Like all of Morgan’s 
(1986) metaphors, Wonderland provides only partial insights into organizations and it is not 
meant to suggest that we should abandon rationality for obviously that would threaten the 
fundamentals of life (water, food, shelter, healthcare, education) that in large complex 
societies necessitate organization. Nevertheless, this does not mean reverting to instrumental 
rationality but rather debating and being open to alternative possibilities that reflect upon 
both the ‘means’ and ‘ends’ of  rationality (see Alvesson, 1984; Reed, 1991). 
Although Morgan (2011) emphasises the ‘practical impacts’ (Morgan, 2011: 470) of 
metaphor, there is a compatibility between his approach and the Wonderland metaphor. 
Hence he sought to show how metaphors ‘can frame and reframe our understanding of the 
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same situation, in the belief that new kinds of understanding can emerge from the process’ 
(Morgan, 1986: 340). This is consistent with the Wonderland metaphor because it provides ‘a 
novel or surprising likeness’ (Davidson, 1978: 31) between seemingly incompatible things. 
Metaphorically, the Wonderland metaphor is offered as a firework to light up the 
organizational night sky allowing us to see things crouching beneath the rocks, lurking in the 
shadows that are often hidden from view. It could lead to a change in practice through reverse 
engineering as absurdities are identified; however, new absurdities are apt to arise as extant 
absurdities are addressed. 
The notion that ‘organizations are many things at once’ (Morgan, 1986: 339) is central to 
Morgan’s (1986) thesis and so his metaphors are seen as ‘intertwined’ (Morgan, 1986: 341). 
Each is understood to fit certain situations better than others ‘but we must always remember 
that aspects of every metaphor may be found in every situation’ (Morgan, 1986: 342). The 
Wonderland metaphor can therefore be added into the mix and it relates to the other 
metaphors that Morgan (1986) identifies. Hence, taken to its extreme, the machine metaphor 
reduces people to mechanical parts, which is absurd whilst the culture metaphor, whereby 
organizations are managed through values and beliefs, taken to an extreme, can be likened to 
George Orwell’s 1984 (Willmott, 1993) or to an ‘iron cage’ of teamwork (Barker, 1993). 
In these situations, Wonderland can be glimpsed and yet it is sufficiently distinctive and 
relevant for understanding organizations to be considered as a metaphor in its own right. It 
draws our attention to dynamics that have been ‘imprisoned’ (Morgan, 1980: 605) by 
metaphors that far more readily lend themselves to the rational model and managerialism. 
The Wonderland metaphor points towards irrationality, disorder, unreason and uncertainty, 
which does not easily fit with the metaphors in Morgan’s (1986) text. It challenges the 
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rational model and therefore avoids being ‘intuitively conservative and, thus, cognitively 
prescriptive rather than liberating’ (Oswick et al., 2002: 298). 
The Wonderland metaphor allows for ‘a willingness to abandon feelings of confident 
mastery’ and rejects ‘the conventional aesthetic hunger to transform a messy, unsettled world 
into a place of fixed, rational continuities’ (DeMott, 1989: 132). In the wake of the 2008 
GFC, such caution, reflexivity and modest thinking is perhaps more relevant now than ever as 
it allows for ‘a recognition of fallibility and limits to our rationality’ (Gabriel, 2010: 757). 
This article has focused on the movement from metaphor as the source domain by 
challenging our understanding of the organizational target domain. It has not considered the 
interactive theory of metaphor whereby our understanding of the Wonderland metaphor could 
be changed (Black, 1962). To do so would involve using the rational model of organization to 
analyse and resolve the various elements of the Wonderland metaphor and yet this would 
contradict its very purpose. Rather than leaving ‘the church of decision-making theory’ 
(Reed, 1991: 566), it would amount to rebuilding it and introducing new hymns. 
To conclude, Images of Organization, though an original, erudite and powerful way of 
understanding organizations overemphasises rationality and this reflects its managerial 
leanings. Rather than a prescriptive tool, the Wonderland metaphor points in a different 
direction.  It directs us to explore what are daily experiences for many in the belief that this 
will surface buried or neglected issues in a way that questions the status quo; it seeks to 
understand the world of the underdog or tenant rather than the landlord; it encourages 
reflexivity on the extant order rather than offering a means to manage or escape it. Finally, it 
rails against managerialism, for it is understood that each new means to manage is apt to 
generate new absurdities and this is valuable because it points towards the limits of 
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i Weick’s (1976) emphasis on the functional aspects of loosely coupled systems and Morgan’s (1986), at times, 
managerial discussion of politics suggests a tension in terms of whether irrationality or politics are an everyday 
feature of organizations or something that can be managed.  
ii According to Foucault (1982) power is not a possession that some have and others do not. Instead, power 
reflects ‘modes of action upon possible action, the actions of others’ (Foucault,1982:224) and so because 
others can act contrary to our intentions, this means that outcomes are always uncertain.  
